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for this invention in 1942, he was entitled to compute his taxes as if
the sum received in 1942 had been received ratably during the 36-month
period ended on February 7, 1931, the date of completion. Both the
Circuit Court and the Supreme Court in the Robertson case found that
the statute expressly calls for proration of the amount received in a
taxable year "over that part of the period preceding the close of the
taxable year" not to exceed 36 months. Thus the income will be allocated
over the 36-month period preceding the close of the taxable year in
which received even though the actual work was performed in years
preceding the date of payment by more than 36 months.
Thus it appears that in nearly all cases of prizes won in contests the
value of the prize will be taxable unless it can be demonstrated that the
prize was given as a gift to aid the furtherance of science or education,
or the award is made in recognition of past achievements or present
abilities,80 and not given in exchange for services rendered. One must
look to the nature and intent of the donor 8 l and also determine whether
services were rendered by the recipient. If the donor is a nontaxable
philanthropic trust, it is easier to establish the requisite conditions necessary to constitute the prize a gift.
CONTRACTS-COURT OF CLAIMS RULES REVOCATION OF
OFFER BEFORE ACCEPTANCE INEFFECTIVE
In response to a government solicitation, the plaintiff submitted a bid
(offer) on a contemplated contract. Prior to acceptance by the government, but after the bids had been opened, the plaintiff attempted to revoke
this offer. In a very curious opinion the Court of Claims declared that
this revocation was ineffective. Refining Associates Inc. v. United States,

109 F. Supp. 259 (Ct. Cl., 1953).
In recent years the Court of Claims has made some pronouncements
concerning contract law which seem contra to all precedent and reason.
This was not so eight years ago, when in the case of Miller v. United
States,1 the court handed down a superlative decision presenting an accurate analysis of the common law principles governing offer and acceptance of contracts.
The Miller case involved a plaintiff who, after submitting a bid of
30Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revneue, 279 U.S. 716
(1929).
81 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Jacobsen, 336 U.S. 28 (1949); Bogardus v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 302 U.S. 34 (1937); Smith v. Manning, 189 F. 2d
345 (C.A. 3rd, 1951); Poorman v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 131 F. 2d 946
(C.A. 9th, 1942); Fisher v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 59 F. 2d 192 (C.A. 2d,
1932).
162 F. Supp. 327 (Ct. Cl., 1945).
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$693,000.00 to the National Housing Agency, sent a telegram lowering
the bid to $643,000.00. The bids were opened before the defendants received the telegram. Plaintiff's agent, who was present at the opening,
notified the plaintiff that its original bid of $693,000.00 was low. The
plaintiff then instructed the agent to request the defendant to ignore the
telegram when it arrived. The plaintiff's agent did as instructed, and
plaintiff later repeated the request in a telegram.
The government contended that the requirement of submitting a bid
bond with the offer rendered plaintiff's reduced bid irrevocable for thir-

ty days, giving it the same effect as an offer made for consideration, or an
offer under seal at common law.

In a well written decision by Judge Madden, the court pointed out
that an offer is not made until communicated to the offeree and so the
issue was not the revocation of an offer, but rather the making or non-

making of one. The second bid never became an offer, for the government had been notified, before receiving the bid, that it was not intended
as an offer.
However, four years later the court seems to have embarked on a campaign to revise the law of contracts. Thus in 1949, in the case of Dick v.
United States,2 a plaintiff came before the same tribunal and convinced
the court that the acceptance of an offer may be nullified before receipt
of the same by the offeror. Nearly all precedent holds that while an offer
may be revoked at any time before acceptance, an acceptance, if sent by
authorized means, is effective when dispatched. 8
In the Dick case, the Coast Guard invited bids on two sets of propeller
equipment. Plaintiff submitted a quotation of $68,275.00 in the mistaken
belief that defendant's request was for only one set. Defendant sent a
purchase order, which amounted to a counteroffer, to plaintiff on
March 8, and plaintiff mailed an acceptance on March 15. Plaintiff discovered his error, and on March 16 wired defendant that the price
should be doubled. Plaintiff's acceptance of March 15 was not received
by the defendant until March 21.
In allowing this "revocation of an acceptance," the court based their
decision on the premise that the old common law rule making an acceptance final when deposited in the mail was modified in 1913 by a postal
regulation permitting the sender to apply for a letter which he has put
in the mail. The court cited Corpus Juris Secundum 4' and a Tennessee
decision 5 as its dubious authority for this unique result.
Judge Madden, who wrote the excellent decision in the Miller case,
dissented in the Dick case on well established principles of contract law
8 Rest., Contracts S64 (1933).
2 82 F. Supp. 326 (Ct. CL., 1949).
4 17 C.J.S. Contracts S 5.405 (1939).
5Traders' Nat. Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 142 Tenn. 229, 217 S.W. 977 (1920).
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and criticized the majority for ignoring such strong precedent. In maintaining that the acceptance was operative when mailed despite the postal
regulation, he pointed out that any contrary conclusion would lead to
the result that the offeree, by mailing the acceptance, could bind the
offeror at the time of mailing, but the offeror, to whom he mailed the
acceptance, could not hold the offeree until he received the letter, his
rights being subject to the sender's power to withdraw his letter from the
mails at any time before delivery.
However, the court refused to allow the persuasiveness of Judge
Madden's argument to deter them. It is difficult to comprehend how
the same court, which handed down the decision in the Miller case and
expounded so accurately on the well established principles of contract
law, could deviate so drastically from these doctrines in the Dick case.
The decision in the Dick case was the subject of severe criticism from
many sources.6 It was pointed out that it was possible to withdraw a
letter from the mail prior to the postal regulation of 1913,7 in fact as
early as 1902.8 No court had interpreted this as enabling an offeree to
cancel an acceptance and there is no reason to give the 1913 regulation
such an extraordinary effect.
The instant case is also subject to severe criticism. Here the plaintiff
received an Invitation for Bids issued by defendant. The following provision contained in United States Standard Form 22, was incorporated
into the invitation by reference:
Bids may be withdrawn on written or telegraphic request received from
bidders prior to the time fixed for opening. Negligence on the part of the
bidder in preparing the bid confers no right for the withdrawal of the bid
after it has been opened. 9
Also applicable was Section 852.303 of the Armed Services Procurement Regulations which provides, in part, that bids may not be modified
or withdrawn after opening unless such modification or withdrawal is
received before the award is made, and the failure of such modification
or withdrawal to arrive before opening was due solely to a delay in the
mails, or the modification is in the interest of the government and not
prejudicial to other parties. 10
Between September 30, and October 12, 1948, plaintiff submitted its
bids. On October 21, six days after opening of bids, plaintiff sent a tele634 Cornell L.Q. 632 (1949); 38 Geo. L.J. 106 (1949); 62 Harv. L. Rev. 1231 (1949);
44 111. L. Rev. 349 (1949); 18 U. of Gin. L. Rev. 381 (1949); 35 Va. L. Rev. 508 (1949)
34 Minn. L. Rev. 140 (1950); 25 Ind. L. J. 202 (1950); 17 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 375
(1950); 59 Yale L. J. 374 (1950).
7 U.S. Post Office Reg. (1913) SS 552, 553.
s U.S. Post Office Reg. (1902) S 579.
941 U.S.C.A. App. § 54.12 subd. 12 (1951).
1013 F.R. 3074 (1948).
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gram to defendant attempting to withdraw certain of its bids because of
circumstances beyond its control. These circumstances turned out to be
a strike of refining employees, which had begun on September 1, 1948,
and a similar dispute involving longshoremen, which had started August
25, 1948. Both strikes continued until December 16, 1948.
Under these facts, if the court had found that the regulations applied
to the bid and deprived the plaintiff of its right to withdraw the offer
before acceptance, no fault could be found with the decision. However,
after stating that the government contended that these regulations applied to the contract and that the plaintiff denied this contention, the
court ignored the regulations and went on to reach its result through a
series of irrelevant and questionable pronouncements.
It was conceded by the court that when the United States enters into
contractual relations, its rights and duties are governed generally by the
law applicable to contracts between private persons. It was also conceded
that under these ordinary principles of contract law, an offer, not under
seal or for a consideration, may be revoked at any time before acceptance.
The court referred to three of its prior decisions. In the first it had
allowed a plaintiff to modify a bid after opening but prior to acceptance
on the grounds of a mistake which should have been evident to the
government." In the second case the court held the government could
accept a lower bid received after the opening of the bids on the ground
that since the provision was for the benefit of the government, it could
waive it. 12 And in the third case the court had held a bid could be withdrawn when the plaintiff was under an erroneous impression as to the
13
time of delivery.
In the present case the court held the revocation was not valid because
plaintiff's contention that the revocation was due to strikes was unjustified. This, by implication, sets out the new doctrine that one cannot
revoke an offer unless he has justifiable grounds.
The court then stated that the plaintiff submitted the bid subject to
the regulations and, "In so doing, the plaintiff was accorded the right
of having its bid considered on its merits, and this right was conditioned
on the promise that the bid would remain open during the time speci14
fied."
This seems to imply that the "right of having its bid considered on
its merits" was the consideration to the plaintiff which made the bid
irrevocable. It is obvious of course, that there is no legal basis for this
contention.
11 Alta Electric and Mechanical Co. v. United States, 90 Ct. Cl. 466 (1940).
12 Leitman v. United States, 60 F. Supp. 218 (Ct. Cl., 1945).
1

8Nason Coal Co. v. United States, 64 Ct. Cl. 526 (1928).
14Refining Associates v. United States, 109 F. Supp. 259, 262 (Ct. Cl., 1953).

DE PAUL LAW REVIEW

The next paragraph of the opinion states that "Where there is no
mistake, unreasonable delay, or the like, there can be no injustice in
holding the bidder to the conditions of the Invitation for Bids."' 15 One
might point out the injustice in denying to this plaintiff a right that all
offerors have had for centuries, namely, the right to revoke an offer at
any time before acceptance.
In the decision as a whole, the court seems to object to the grounds
for the plaintiff's attempted revocation and to penalize the plaintiff for
lacking what the court considers justifiable grounds for revocation. The
groundlessness of this reasoning is apparent from the fact that the general rule is that revocation of an offer requires no such justification. An
offer, not under seal or for a consideration, may be revoked at any time
before acceptance, regardless of the offeror's reasons for so doing. 10
. It is probable that the court could have reached the same result on
the more logical ground that Congress, under the powers to wage war
and to maintain an army, could change the common law as to army
contracts, and that the regulations, which were promulgated under an
act of Congress, had the effect of rendering the offer irrevocable. One
might speculate that Judge Madden who wrote such fine decisions in
the Miller case and the Dick case, concurred in the seemingly unfounded
legal reasoning promulgated in the instant opinion because he realized
that he would have to concur in the result, if the above reasoning were
adopted.
In the light of the Dick case and the Refining Associates case, a lawyer will now have a difficult time advising a client as to any contractual
problem which might arise before the Court of Claims.
TAXATION-SALES FOR "USE OR CONSUMPTION"
UNDER RETAILERS' OCCUPATION TAX ACT
Plaintiff dairy company brought this action against the Illinois Department of Revenue to obtain credit for taxes paid from 1944 to 1947 on
gross receipts from sales of milk to a state mental institution. The milk
was purchased by the institution for consumption by inmates. The Circuit Court of Kane County entered judgment for plaintiff, and defendant
appealed. The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed and remanded, holding
that the legislative intent in passing the Retailers' Occupation Tax was
to reach sales to purchasers for use or consumption and that it intended
the tax to apply wherever the contemplated use of the tangible personal
property would take such property off the retail market. Modern Dairy

Company, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 413 Ill. 55, 108 N.E. 2d 8
(1952).
15 Ibid.

16 Rest., Contracts § 41 (1933).

